Normal view MARC view ISBD view

The IMF As a Biased Global Insurance Mechanism: Asymmetrical Moral Hazard, Reserve Accumulation, and Financial Crises /

Lipscy, Phillip Y.

The IMF As a Biased Global Insurance Mechanism: Asymmetrical Moral Hazard, Reserve Accumulation, and Financial Crises / Phillip Y. Lipscy; Haillie Na-Kyung Lee. - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Winter 2019. - 73:1; 35-64.

Subjects--Topical Terms:
International Monetary Fund (IMF)
Financial crises

LC Class. No.: IO / 73:1 2019

Print
Cite
Add to your cart (remove)
Save record
BIBTEX Dublin Core MARCXML MARC (non-Unicode/MARC-8) MARC (Unicode/UTF-8) MARC (Unicode/UTF-8, Standard) MODS (XML) RIS ISBD
More searches

Search for this title in:
Other Libraries (WorldCat) Other Databases (Google Scholar) Online Stores (Bookfinder.com) Open Library (openlibrary.org) Internet Archive Scholar - Search for similar title Internet Archive Scholar - Search for similar author